Foreign Bank Penetration and the Domestic Banking System: Empirical Evidence from Turkey Based on the Var Approach by Kirikkaleli, Derviş
0001-6373/$20.00 © 2016 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
Acta Oeconomica,Vol. 66 (1), pp. 79–105 (2016)
DOI: 10.1556/032.2016.66.1.4
FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION 
AND THE DOMESTIC BANKING SYSTEM: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY BASED 
ON THE VAR APPROACH
Derviş KIRIKKALELI
(Received: 29 March 2014; revision received: 8 May 2014;
accepted: 15 December 2014)  
Foreign Bank Penetration and the Turkish Banking System
D. KIRIKKALELI
I seek to investigate the relationship, if exits, between foreign bank penetration (FBP) and the de-
terminants of bank performance, namely domestic bank assets (DB), domestic credit (CREDIT), 
and banking profi tability (PRO) in Turkey using quarterly data from 1994Q1 to 2009Q4, while 
controlling for GDP and the event of the 2001 fi nancial crisis. Using the Granger causality, impulse 
response function and variance decomposition, the short run dynamics are examined. The outcome 
of the Granger causality test indicates that there is unilateral causality, which runs from domestic 
bank assets to FBP at the 10% level. Moreover, I also fi nd feedback causality between FBP and 
CREDIT at the 5% level. By employing impulse response functions, my fi ndings reveal that rising 
foreign bank assets in Turkey tend to increase domestic bank assets and credit availability in short 
run, and vice versa. Surprisingly, no signifi cant impact of FBP on profi tability in the banking sector 
is observed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have brought many changes to the financial sector in the de-
veloping countries due mainly to the globalisation of the finance sectors. Along-
side the globalisation process, foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational 
bank activities have gradually risen. This process has motivated researchers to 
investigate foreign banks comprehensively. The share of foreign assets, on aver-
age, increased to almost 40% in 2005 from 22% in 1996. Moreover, total credit 
provided by foreign banks jumped to 26% of GDP in 2008 from 10% in 1996.  
Some researchers underlined the positive impact of foreign bank penetration 
(FBP) on capital ratio, efficiency and competition, credit availability, manage-
rial skills, technology, and innovation capacity. However, others have taken into 
account the flip side of the coin by blaming FBP as a main reason behind the 
destabilisation of the domestic banking system. Empirical studies have revealed 
that the positive impact of FBP on the domestic banking system predominated 
(Cull – Peria 2010). Due to this, politicians in the world have encouraged foreign 
banks to take advantage of this since the beginning of the 1980s. 
This study seeks to reveal the relationship between FBP and bank performance 
(namely, domestic bank assets, domestic credit, and bank profitability), while 
controlling for GDP and the event of the 2001 financial crisis. 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the exist-
ing literature. Section 3 and 4 present the data and empirical methodology, Sec-
tion 5 reports the empirical findings from the VAR models. Section 6 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish economy, especially the finance sec-
tor, was struggling with liquidity problems. In fact, Turkey in 1994 faced one of 
the most destructive crises in its modern history. In order to reduce uncertainty in 
the finance sector, the Turkish government started to provide a 100% insurance 
guarantee for deposits. Not surprisingly, the guarantee encouraged both public 
and private banks – including foreigners – in Turkey to take more risks, which 
was due mostly to borrowing with a high interest rate and lending with taking 
an open position. Then, the new banking law (No. 4389) was prepared and came 
into force to fix the problems of unhealthy banks in June 1999. According to the 
law, the criteria of establishing a bank, opening a branch, taking over a bank by 
the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), and cancelling the licence of a bank 
in Turkey were re-regulated. The law facilitated the possible sale or merger of 
unhealthy banks under the control of the SDIF (Denizer 1998). Therefore, six un-
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wholesome Turkish banks (Interbank, Egebank, Yurtbank, Sumerbank, Esbank, 
and Yasarbank) were taken over by the SDIF in 1999. The inefficient banking 
system triggered the banking crisis at the end of 2000 and as a solution, the ex-
change rate regime changed and a flexible exchange regime was implemented. 
The combined effect of these factors triggered the economic crisis in February 
2001. Due to these reasons, foreign bank entries in Turkey had not been accel-
erated and the share of bank assets that were held by foreign banks in Turkey 
remained below 6% until the mid-2000s.
In order to rebuild the destroyed economy and the financial system as a re-
sult of the 2000 banking and 2001 economic crises, the Transition to the Strong 
Economy Program (TSEP) and the Restructuring Program for the Banking Sector 
(RPBS) were implemented.1 Moreover, the reforms were accelerated: for example 
a switch to a floating exchange rate from a pegged exchange rate granted greater 
central bank independence and the pursuit of a more credible monetary policy. 
The first sale of TMSF bank in the post-2001 crisis period was realised by the sale 
of Demirbank to HSBC bank for US$ 350 million. After this sale, the perspective 
of European banks over SDIF banks changed positively (Bumin 2007).
Until the beginning of the 2000s, due to high systemic risk in Turkey, the share 
of foreign bank assets remained below 5% and the expected competitive banking 
system could not be achieved despite foreign bank entries in the 1980s. How-
ever, positive macroeconomic indicators, the achievement of political stability, 
the acceleration of reforms, especially in the finance sector (such as the switch 
to a floating exchange rate, granting greater central bank independence and the 
pursuit of a more credible monetary policy), the foundation of the Coordination 
Council and Investment Advisory Council, a new FDI law (No.6224), and the re-
duction in corporate tax led to a high growth rate in the banking sector in Turkey, 
except for the global crisis period (4th quarter of 2008 and 1st quarter of 2009). 
The ratio of the total bank assets in the banking sector to GNP increased from 
67% in 2005 to 82% in 2009. The share of bank assets held by the foreign banks 
jumped from US$ 8.15 billion (3.50% of the total banking assets) in 2005Q1 to 
1  While the goals of TSEP were to accelerate the privatisation of unhealthy public companies 
and to achieve economic and financial stability via reconstructing trust and confidence in the 
market, RPBS aimed to restructure unhealthy banks and public banks, to prepare world-wide 
acceptable banking regulation and regulatory environment, and, finally, to strengthen private 
banking, whether domestic or foreign. During the reconstructing period, the penetration of 
foreign banks to the market was facilitated to benefit from the know-how, technology, mana-
gerial skills, and capital of foreign banks. Moreover, the capital structure of domestic public 
or private banks was strengthened based on the Basel II criteria and the sales of SDIF banks 
were accelerated (Bumin 2007).
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US$ 84.24 billion (13.72% of the total banking assets) in 2010Q3,2 although the 
total number of foreign banks fell to 17. Moreover, the entry mode of foreign 
banks changed in the post-2001 period. In this period, they have mostly preferred 
the share acquisition of domestic banks as the entry mode rather than to open a 
branch or representation in the banking sector. 
The negotiations on the integration of Turkey into the EU and the gradual rise 
of the share of banking assets to GNP have made Turkey a more interesting coun-
try to investigate and opened new debate on the banking sector. 
Although the performance of foreign and domestic banks was meticulously 
investigated by Isik – Hassan (2002), Yildirim (2002), Demir et al. (2005), Oz-
kan-Gunay – Tektas (2006), Denizer et al. (2007), Aysan – Ceyhan (2008), and 
Fukuyama – Matousek (2011), the relationship, if exists, between banking per-
formance and FBP has not been explored. Therefore, the objective of this paper 
is threefold: 1) to investigate the relationship between domestic bank assets and 
FBP; 2) to detect the relationship between domestic credit (DC) and FDP; and 3) 
to investigate the relationship between FBP and banking profitability. 
Knickerbocker (1973) developed the “follow the leader” theory, combining it 
with the defensive FDI approach. According to his approach, in an oligopolistic 
market, the direct investment of a firm will encourage its rivals to invest in the 
same foreign market, because if the rivals do not follow the leader company – 
which invests first into the foreign market – the rivals will lose their competi-
tive stature in their home market. However, how FBP affects the behaviour of 
domestic banks in the host country and how rising (or falling) domestic assets in 
the bank system will affect the location choice of the foreign bank have not been 
explored in detail. Regarding domestic bank assets, only one study, Engwall 
et al. (2001), analyses the impact of the foreign bank assets on domestic bank 
assets in the Nordic countries: they found that rising (or falling) foreign bank 
assets were associated with higher (or lower) domestic bank assets in Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland. However, this hypothesis did not hold in Denmark. Oth-
erwise, there is still a big question mark about the possible impact of domestic 
bank assets on FBP. In other words, the reaction of foreign banks when the do-
mestic bank assets rise (or fall) has not been investigated in Turkey. This study 
also aims to fill this gap. 
Credit availability has been used widely as a proxy for financial development 
in empirical papers. The majority of researchers agree that FBP to a host country 
is associated with better financial conditions, but this finding mostly indicates 
that foreign banks are less willing to lend to domestic companies, especially 
2  These ratios are calculated by the author using data from The Bank Association of Turkey and 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION AND THE TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 83
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
small ones, than domestic banks do. This may arise due to the lack of informa-
tion and difficulty and cost to gather information about small companies in the 
host markets.
Although some studies (Bleger – Rozenwurcel 2000; Goldberg et al. 2000; 
Berger et al. 2001; Satta 2004; Clarke et al. 2005; Clarke 2006; Main 2006; Detra-
giache et al. 2008) compare the credit provision of domestic and overseas banks 
to the domestic market in a specific country or group of countries, the dynamic 
relationship between FBP and credit availability has remained unexplored. The 
findings of Berger et al. (2001) reveal that small companies in Argentina have 
a lesser chance of getting credit from foreign and large banks relative to large 
companies. Moreover, Mian (2006) finds that foreign banks in Pakistan are less 
willing to lend to opaque businesses relative to domestic banks. The findings of 
Bleger – Rozenwurcel (2000) show that between 1996 and 1998, FBP led to the 
reduction of bank credits to small enterprises to 16% from 20% in Argentina. By 
analysing banking sectors in Mexico and Argentina, Goldberg et al. (2000) find 
that the loan growth of overseas banks was much more than that of domestic 
banks in these countries. Furthermore, the overseas banks contributed positively 
to both the volatility of lending and credit. They also point out that the credit 
growth of foreign banks in these countries did not change dramatically through-
out the domestic crises at the end of the 1990s.  
Clarke (2006) investigates the effect of FBP on domestic market credit avail-
ability using the surveying technique in 38 transition and developing countries. 
He points out that domestic credit is positively affected by FBP. However, his 
findings also indicated that the contribution of foreign banks to credit provision 
for small and medium companies is less than that of domestic banks. Cross-coun-
try level evidence of Detragiache et al. (2008) also supports the idea that FBP is 
associated with less credit provision. This evidence is based on 89 low-income 
countries for the period of 1999–2002. 
A different finding regarding this issue comes from Clarke et al. (2005), who 
conclude that large foreign banks in Chile and Colombia lent more to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises than domestic banks. Moreover, medium and large for-
eign banks in Argentina and Chile achieved higher growth of lending to small 
enterprises relative to medium and large domestic banks during the period of 
1997–2000. In most cases, the evidence indicates that foreign banks are less will-
ing to lend to domestic companies, especially small ones, than domestic banks. 
This may arise due to lack of information, the difficulty and cost of gathering 
information about small companies, and because of different economic, financial, 
political, and social factors among countries. 
In line with both empirical and theoretical research, profitability in a host coun-
try is a main driving factor of foreign banks. Claessens et al. (2001) investigate 
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the impact of FBP on domestic banks using almost 8000 banks from 80 countries 
for the period of 1988–1995. They find that foreign banks tend to run businesses 
more profitably relative to domestic banks and the rise of foreign banks in these 
markets tends to reduce the host banking sector’s profitability. Denizer (2000) 
examines the effect of foreign banks on the banking sector in Turkey using an-
nual data sets from 1980 to 1997. His findings reveal that FBP is inversely related 
to the return on assets. Zajc (2004) examines the effect of overseas banks on the 
performance of domestic banks in six European transition countries. His find-
ings indicate that overseas banks tend to reduce profitability and raise the cost of 
indigenous banks. 
Lensink – Hermes (2004) build on the study of Claessens (2001). They find 
that FBP does not have a strong impact on the domestic profitability at lower 
levels of economic development. Furthermore, at higher levels of economic de-
velopment of the host countries, the impacts are not clear because FBP is either 
associated with falling profitability in the banking sector or not associated with 
any change in profitability. 
Apart from the impact of FBP on the host country, Facarelli – Pozzolo (2000) 
and Bumin (2007) investigate the possible effects of profitability on foreign banks 
by examining the factors influencing the location choice of overseas banks. The 
empirical result of Facarelli – Pozzolo (2000)’s paper using 260 banks’ data from 
OECD countries indicates that profitability resulting from an expected growth is 
one of the main factors influencing the location choice of foreign banks, espe-
cially for subsidiaries. Moreover, integration between the host and home markets 
plays a role in the decision of foreign banks. Bumin (2007) tries to identify the 
key factors determining foreign banks in Turkey using data from January 2003 
to June 2006. His findings indicate that profitability in the banking sector is the 
main factor influencing foreign banks. Furthermore, economic growth, poten-
tial demand for banking services are the other determinants of foreign banks in 
Turkey. However, none of these papers investigated two-way linkages between 
FBP and profitability using the same data set. I aim to fill this gap for Turkey by 
investigating the relationship between profitability and FBP. 
Although numerous papers investigated either the determinant or impact of 
FBP in developed or developing markets, the two-way linkage between FBP and 
the banking variables used the same data set. Therefore, this paper is likely to 
open new debate on this subject, not only in the Turkish banking system. 
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3. DATA
The time series variables used in the empirical tests of this paper consist of quar-
terly data for the period 1994Q1 to 2009Q4 (64 observations). The time series 
variables used in the models are shown below:3
FBP: Total assets held by foreign banks in the banking sector. Holding a 50% 
share acquisition by a foreign bank or foreign investor in a host country is regard-
ed as a minimum requirement for having an important influence on the manage-
ment of the acquired bank in Turkey. In other words, after acquiring 50% or more 
shares, a domestic bank is recorded as a foreign bank in most of the countries. 
PRO: Return on assets in the banking sector was used as a proxy for profitability 
in the banking sector. The raw data were used because some observations for the 
variable are negative.
CREDIT: Total domestic credit provided by banks in Turkey. The variable was 
also expressed in its logarithmic transformation. 
DB: Total assets in the banking sector, excluding the foreign ones. The variable 
was expressed in its logarithmic transformation.
GDP: The level of nominal GDP is used as a control variable since it is believed 
that GDP is an important determinant of FDI, FBP and FPI. The findings of Buch 
(2000), Brealey – Kaplanis (1996) and Yamori (1998) underlined that GDP in 
host countries seems to be the most important factor that affects the location deci-
sion of multinational banks. 
DUM2001: This is used as a control variable since it is believed that the financial 
crisis in 2001 led to significant changes in the Turkish banking sector. 
Descriptive statistics for FBP, PRO, CREDIT, and DB variables are demon-
strated in Table 1. 
The FBP variable shows variation, ranging from 7.36 to 11.28. Moreover, there 
is also variation in the DB, CREDIT, and PRO variables, ranging from 10.74 to 
13.05, from 9.76 to 12.40, and from –3.25 to 5.02, respectively. Table 1 also 
3  The figures of total assets of foreign banks, total credit, total assets, and return on assets in 
the banking sector are not presented in the paper. However, the author will provide these upon 
request.   
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provides information about the distribution of the variables by using skewness, 
kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera test. Whereas FBP, CREDIT, and DB variables are 
positively skewed, the PRO variable is negatively skewed. Regarding kurtosis, 
the distribution of FBP, CREDIT, and DB variables has large tails (more peaked), 
while the distribution of the PRO variable has small tails (flatter). In addition, the 
result of the Jarque-Bera test reveals that the distribution of FBP, CREDIT vari-
ables, and PRO variables is normal, but the null hypothesis that DB has a normal 
distribution cannot be rejected with a χ2 = 4.307 (p-value = 0.116). 
4. METHODOLOGY
We tested the short run dynamics between FBP and the determinants of bank per-
formance (namely, total bank assets, domestic credit, and banking profitability), 
while controlling for GDP and the 2001 financial crisis. The first step is to deter-
mine whether or not the variables have a unit root. The early paper of Dickey – 
Fuller (1979, ADF) investigated how to test unit root in the time series variables. 
Then, Phillips – Perron (1988) developed another unit root test (PP unit root test). 
The main difference between the ADF and PP tests arises in a case of heteroske-
dasticity and serial correlation. The results of these tests may be significantly 
different because of different ways to correct serial correlation when the sample 
size is finite. Moreover, the PP and ADF tests have low power when AR root is 
close to 1 (Cochrane 1991). Thus, the alternative hypothesis could not accept 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables of FBP, PRO, CREDIT and DB
FBP PRO CREDIT DB
 Mean 8.900 1.191 10.769 11.852
 Median 8.600 1.298 10.479 11.741
 Maximum 11.280 5.023 12.401 13.049
 Minimum 7.357 –3.249 9.755 10.739
 Std. Dev. 1.212 1.572 0.774 0.671
 Skewness 0.797 –0.831 0.868 0.294
 Kurtosis 2.427 4.309 2.379 1.926
 Jarque-Bera 8.266 12.881 9.788 4.307
 Probability 0.016 0.001 0.007 0.116
 Sum 614.115 82.247 743.126 817.808
 Sum Sq. Dev. 99.936 168.043 40.800 30.690
 Observations 64 64 64 64
Note: The data is based on 64 observations (1994Q1–2009Q4).
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and The Bank Association of Turkey.
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when the sample size is small (DeJong et al. 1992). In addition, when trend adds 
to the regression in these unit root tests, the power of such tests reduces, there-
fore including only the constant in the regression has more power than a test that 
includes both an intercept and a trend. The conventional PP and ADF tests are 
still the most popular unit root tests in macroeconomic and financial modelling 
despite these weaknesses of such tests. However, as suggested by Zivot – Wang 
(2005), to overcome these problems, more efficient unit root tests – Ng-Perron 
(2001) and ERS point optimal (1996) – were used to detect whether the banking 
variables have unit root, in other words, whether they are non-stationary. 
The PP test of Perron – Ng (1996, 2001) uses the GLS detrending procedure 
of ERS. The unit root test is constructed by four test statistics, which are MZα, 
MZt, MSB, and MPT. In my models, only the MZα test statistic was employed 
and its results are shown in Table 2. The MZα test statistic is defined as; MZα = 
(T–1 ( dty )








  , the statistic MZα is a more effective 
version of Zα of the PP in terms of size and power. 
Another unit root test that is used in this paper is the ERS point optimum. The 
latter was developed by Elliott et al. (1996), and is based on the quasi-differenc-
ing regression, which is defined as: d (vt|a) = d (zt|a)’β (a) + et; where d (vt|a) and 
d (zt|a) are quasi-differenced data for vt and zt, respectively. Moreover, et is the 
residual term and β (a) is the coefficient to be estimated in the quasi-differencing 
regression. While the null hypothesis tested is α = 1, the alternative hypothesis 
tested is α = ā where ā = 1–7/T when zt contains only a constant, and ā = 1–13.5/T 
when zt contains both a constant and a trend. The test statistics in the ERS point 
optimum to test Ho is defined as; PT = (SSR (ā) – (ā) SSR (1)) / fo where fo, at 
frequency zero, is an estimator for the error spectrum. 
It is well-known that the lag length specification is another important issue 
for macroeconometric and financial modelling. In the literature, there is no cri-
terion that gives perfectly consistent result better than others. Schwarz (SC) and 
Akaike (AIC) information criteria are widely used information criteria in macro-
econometric and financial modelling. To select the optimal lag for my models, 
the VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria were applied to determine specific lag 
for the models. SC, AIC, Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria, final predic-
tion error (FPE), and sequential modified LR test statistics (LR) were employed 
to select the optimal lag. It is no surprise to have multiple optimal lags for the 
models using 5 different information criteria. My decision is based on the most 
appropriate optimal lag for the VAR models where there is no autocorrelation, no 
serial correlation, and no heteroskedasticity. Therefore, different lags for the VAR 
models are selected based on different information criteria for the models with 
and without the control variables. 
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Next, I employed the VAR-based Granger causality test, which is also called 
the block exogeneity Wald test, to investigate causal relationship in the short run 
between FBP and the determinants of bank performance, namely DB, CREDIT, 
and PRO. The Granger causality is a test to determine (i) whether X variable 
Granger causes the Y variable and (ii) whether Y variable Granger causes the X 
variable. If the Y variable does not cause X, the parameters of X on the lagged Y 
are jointly zeros (Granger 1969). The general equation of the VAR-based Granger 








where n denotes the numbers of lag which were determined by the information 
criterions, β1-6, α1–6, ∞1–6 and ρ1–6 are parameters for estimation, and et and ut are 
residual terms.
I detect whether there is causal relationship among the variables using the 
VAR Granger causality technique. The only criteria to perform VAR Granger 
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causality test are to have stationary variables because if the time series variables 
have unit root, the Wald (χ2) test statistic will be worthless and VAR stability will 
not meet. Therefore, in the VAR models, the first differences of the FBP, DB, 
CREDIT, and GDP variables were used, whereas the level of the PRO variable 
was used. Moreover, the sign of relationship among the variables and how long 
these impacts will remain effective or change over time cannot be investigated by 
the outcomes of the Granger causality test. Therefore, to get information about 
this, I also performed the generalised impulse response function and variance 
decomposition as suggested by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran – Shin (1998).
The conventional impulse response (Sims 1980) is heavily criticised due to the 
orthogonality assumption. The conventional impulse response, which is based on 
the Choleski factorisation of vector autoregression, is sensitive to variable order. 
The developed version of the impulse response function, called “generalised im-
pulse response function” in the system, is indifferent of the ordering of the vari-
able. The effect of the X variable on the Y variable or the effect of changing the 
X variable on the Y variable can be evaluated over specific time by the impulse 
response function (Hill et al. 2008). In other words, the magnitude of the effect of 
the innovation is investigated by the outcome of the impulse response technique 
(Pesaran – Shin 1998). In all models, the impulse response at the 5% level was 
accepted as significant at a point where both the confidence bands are above or 
below the horizontal line. Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the relation-
ship between FBP and the determinants of bank performance, response to a shock 
to the X variable by the X variable was not investigated.
Apart from the impulse response function, I applied the variance decomposi-
tion technique to obtain information about the percentage of the movement in the 
endogenous variables that, because of their own innovations, are against innova-
tions to the other variables. In other words, the technique was performed to test 
the exogeneity of the variables. Using the Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 
replications, the lower and upper error bounds in the variance decompositions 
were calculated in the models. 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Before performing VAR models, the stationarity of time series variables is de-
tected by the Ng-Perron (2001) and ERS Point Optimal (Elliott et al. 1996) unit 
root tests. The results regarding the outcome of the unit root tests are presented in 
Table 2. These tests are performed to find out the order of integration for the FBP, 
PRO, CREDIT, and DB variables. For the first variable – FBP –, integration of 
order zero I (0) is not found because the calculated Ng-Perron MZα test statistics, 
90 D. KIRIKKALELI
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
which are 1.773 (the model with an intercept) and –2.392 (the model with a trend 
and an intercept), are greater than the 5% critical values of –8.10 (the model with 
an intercept) and –17.30 (the model with a trend and an intercept), respectively. 
The results of the ERS point optimum test are in line with the results of the Ng-
Perron in terms of FBP in both cases: (1) the model with an intercept and (2) the 
model with an intercept and a trend. Therefore, the variable has unit root at the 
integration of zero order. In other words, the variable has a higher integration 
order. At the first difference, I (1) of FBP, all test statistics (the model with an 
intercept and the model with a trend and an intercept) are less than its critical val-
ues at the 1% and 5% levels. Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the 
variable is integrated of order 1. Regarding DB and CREDIT variables, Table 2 
indicates that the variables are integrated of order 1. This is literal because of the 
behaviours and trends of these variables.4 The time series data of DB, CREDIT, 
and FBP wander around a trend and this is one of the main indicators of non-
stationary time series. This is due to using the accumulated foreign bank assets, 
accumulated domestic bank assets, and total domestic credit. With respect to the 
PRO variable, the result is complex, because although the calculated Ng-Perron 
test statistic (the model with an intercept) and the calculated ERS–Point Optimal 
test statistics (the model with an intercept and the model with a trend and an inter-
cept) indicate that the variable has unit root, the calculated Ng-Perron test statistic 
(the model with an intercept) is –3.968, which is greater than the 5% critical val-
ues of –8.10. However, I accepted the PRO variable as stationary after examining 
its trend over time since the time series data of PRO clearly fluctuates around an 
intercept.5 Consequently, whilst FBP, DB, and CREDIT variables were I (1), the 
PRO variable was accepted I (0). It is worthy to mention that the findings in MZα 
are in line with the other test statistics of Ng-Perron (2001). Therefore, in the 
VAR models, the first differences of FBP, DB, and CREDIT variables were used 
while the level of PRO was performed. 
This paper employed the VAR-based Granger causality test to investigate the 
short-run causal relationships between FBP and banking variables, while control-
ling for GDP and the 2001 financial crisis. The results regarding short-run causal 
relationships presented in Table 3 are based on chi-square tests (the model with 
and without the control variables). In the first model, I test whether FBP Granger 
cause DB and (ii) whether DB Granger cause FBP. The null hypothesis that 
FBP does not Granger cause DB cannot be rejected with a χ2 = 0.933 (p-value = 
4  The nature of time series data treats as a non-stationary time series because of trending, wan-
dering around an intercept, and wandering around a trend.
5  The fluctuation of time series data around a trend or an intercept reflects the stationarity of 
time series.
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0.333).6 This implies that changes in FBP do not significantly lead to changes in 
domestic bank assets. This is probably due to the dominancy of domestic banks 
in the banking sector in Turkey. The share of foreign bank assets in the banking 
sector has not exceeded 18%. Therefore, the dominancy of domestic banks in the 
banking sector is likely to minimise any reaction of them against FBP to the mar-
ket. Moreover, the result of the first model in Table 3 also shows that DB Granger 
cause FBP at the 10% level with a χ2 = 3.068 (p-value = 0.079). The results also 
suggest that at the 10% level there is unilateral causality which runs from DB to 
FBP. Without the control variables, there is Granger causality from DB to FBP 
even at the 5% level in model 1. This implies that the changes in domestic bank 
6  The optimal lag length – lag (1) – of the first model (the model with the control variables) was 
determined by LR, FPE, and AIC information criteria because the optimal lag length of other 
information criteria led to serial correlation and/or autocorrelation. For the second and third 
models, the same procedures were followed to determine the optimal lag length for the VAR 
models.
Table 2. Unit Root Test for the variables of FBP, PRO, CREDIT and DB
Ng-Perron (MZα) 
a ERS Point Optimal b
C C & T C C & T
FBP 1.773 –2.392 81.944 38.850
DFBP –22.880** –33.478** 0.747** 2.685**
PRO –3.968 –24.825** 1.533** 3.739**
DPRO N.A N.A N.A. N.A.
CREDIT 0.713 –4.314 29.876 25.459
DCREDIT –28.157** –28.889** 0.882** 3.244**
DB 1.827 5.377 143.11 20.113
DDB –31.526** –31.940** 0.814** 2.913**
Notes: C and C&T denote constant and constant and trend, respectively. D initial letter denotes the first differ-
ence of the time series variables. The integration order for the logged GDP is one using the unit root tests. The 
finding regarding GDP is not shown in Table 2 because the paper only investigates the relationship between the 
banking variables and FBP. The variable is used as a control variable.
**, *, and y statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
a  including only constant, one-sided test of the HO model that the variable has unit root; critical values are equal 
to –5.70, –8.10, and –13.80 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a  including a constant and a trend, one-sided test of the HO model that the variable has unit root; critical values 
are equal to –14.20, –17.30, and –23.80 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
b  including only constant, one-sided test of the HO model that the variable has unit root; critical values are equal 
to, 4.008, 3.023, 1.900 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
b  including a constant and a trend, one-sided test of the HO model that the variable has unit root; critical values 
are equal to 6.777, 5.689, 4.235 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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assets significantly lead to changes in FBP. As expected, the reaction of foreign 
banks against possible changes in a host country is more certain and quicker than 
that of domestic banks. 
Table 3 shows the existence of causality from CREDIT to FBP with a χ2 = 
11.696 and from FBP to CREDIT with a χ2 = 5.5627. Thus, there is bilateral or 
feedback causality between CREDIT and FBP at the 5% level. The findings 
in model 2 with the control variables are consistent with model 2 without the 
control variables. In other words, FBP leads to change in domestic credit avail-
ability, and vice versa. The presence of bilateral causality in the second model 
among the variables is not surprising because foreign banks contribute to the 
credit availability of host countries either directly by providing credits to the do-
mestic sectors, or indirectly by affecting the credit availability of domestic banks 
to the domestic market. Credit availability in a market indicates the financial de-
velopment of a country, which is one of the main factors that affect the decision 
of foreign banks while selecting a host country to invest in. Thus, the change in 
financial development in Turkey leads to a change in foreign penetration to the 
banking sector. 
As seen in Table 3, although there was a significant Granger causality from 
PRO to FBP at the 10% level, adding control variables to model 3 eliminated this 
significant causality. However, it is not surprising to detect no causal relationship 
between PRO and FBP at the 5% level in Turkey. The lack of causality from FBP 
to banking profitability is not consistent with pervious empirical findings. This 
is because rising foreign bank assets in Turkey were not associated with a higher 
number of banks.
However, the results of the Granger causality test cannot answer the ques-
tions of the sign of relationship in all models and how long possible impacts will 
remain effective or change over time. To answer these questions for my models, 
I apply the generalised impulse function and variance decomposition techniques, 
controlling for GDP and periodic dummy (DUM2001) variables. Figures 1 to 6 
report the response of banking variables to a shock to the FBP, and vice versa.8 
Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between FBP and 
banking variables, the response to a shock to the X variable by the X variable was 
not investigated. Moreover, the findings between banking variables and control 
variables, and the findings between FBP and control variables are not presented. 
7  In the second model (the model with the control variables), all information criteria gave the 
same optimal lag length, which is lag (2). It is worth mentioning that this estimates the joint 
effects of FBPt–1 and FBPt–2 on CREDIT.
8  The results from the models without control variables regarding the generalised impulse re-
sponse functions are presented in Figures 7–12. 
FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION AND THE TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 93
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
As seen in Figures 1–6, the findings from the generalised impulse response func-
tions are similar in the model with and without the control variables, and there-
fore the explanations are based on the models with the control variables.  
Using a twelve-quarter period, the study also investigated the likely effects of 
shocks to the variables within twelve quarters. Figure 1 illustrates that response 
to initial shock to DB by FBP is positive and significant, but the effect of shocks 
dies away after the 1st period. Thus, in Turkey, rising domestic bank assets con-
tribute to FBP in the short run. 
Figure 2 shows that the reverse line is initially significant and positive. There-
fore, rising FBP leads to an increase of domestic bank assets. This is rational and 
in line with the finding of Engwall et al. (2001). However, the significant shock 
dies away after the 1st period, although the response is also significant and positive 
 Table 3. VAR-based Granger causality (block exogeneity Wald test)
The models with the control variables
Independent Granger Dependent DoF χ2 P-value Decision
variable cause variable 5% level 10% level
Model 1 DB  FBP 1 3.069 0.079 X √
FBP  DB 1 0.933 0.333 X X
Model 2 CREDIT  FBP 2 11.696 0.003 √ √
FBP  CREDIT 2 5.562 0.047 √ √
Model 3 PRO  FBP 2 2.814 0.244 X X
FBP  PRO 2 1.873 0.391 X X
The models without the control variables
Independent Granger Dependent DoF χ2 P-value Decision
variable cause variable 5% level 10% level
Model 1 DB  FBP 3 13.767 0.003 √ √
FBP  DB 3 1.1474 0.688 X X
Model 2 CREDIT  FBP 2 11.849 0.002 √ √
FBP  CREDIT 2 6.312 0.042 √ √
Model 3 PRO  FBP 1 3.465 0.062 X √
FBP  PRO 1 0.422 0.515 X X
Note:  indicates the direction of Granger causality while DoF and χ2 denote the degree of freedom and chi-
square, respectively. The first differences of FBP, DB, and CREDIT variables were used while the level of PRO 
was performed. Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between FBP and banking variables 
(namely DB, CREDIT and PRO), the possible causal impacts of control variables on the banking variables and 
FBP are not presented in Table 3.
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at the 2nd and 4th periods in the model without the control variables.9 The empiri-
cal finding can be supported by an example. First, whenever foreign banks invest 
in a host country, domestic banks are likely to revise their investment strategies 
and they are likely to invest in their home market, rather than abroad, to keep their 
share in the banking sector as high as possible in order to be competitive against 
the foreign banks. Second, foreign banks that invest in a host country are likely 
to have technological and managerial advantages relative to the domestic banks. 
FBP, thus, is likely to force the domestic banks to invest in R&D. If the domestic 
banks do not improve their technological capacity or managerial skills, they can 
lose their competitive edge against the foreigners in the banking sector. As is well 
known, domestic banks mostly invest in R&D in the home market to improve or 
innovate products rather than in the foreign market. Therefore, FBP in the bank-
ing sector tends to increase the investment of domestic banks. 
9  The results with and without the control variables in this model reveal that adding control vari-
ables led to the disappearance of the significant responses in the 2nd and 4th periods. This situa-
tion appears probably because of the importance of the control variables on the FBP variable.  
Figures 1–6. Response to generalised One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
(The models with the control variables)
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In the second model, the effect of a positive shock in FBP is significantly posi-
tive for CREDIT at the 1st and 3rd quarter periods, suggesting that the available 
domestic credit in the market has a positive impact on the FBP, but just for the 
short run. The initial reverse response is significant and positive in Figure 3, im-
plying that the foreign banks are important for domestic credit in the short run in 
Turkey. Therefore, rising foreign bank assets in the banking sector are associated 
with higher credit availability to the domestic market.10 This is consistent with 
the findings of Goldberg et al. (2000) and Clarke (2006). On the other hand, the 
figure also shows that the effect of shocks disappears in the 3rd quarter. This result 
in the second model is in line with the model without the control variables. 
In terms of profitability in the banking sector, the findings are quite interest-
ing; Figure 6 shows that the response of FBP to one standard deviation shock in 
PRO is initially positive, but not statistically significant, although it is signifi-
cant in the model without the control variables. The response is significant and 
10  Apart from actual foreign credit to the domestic market, rising foreign bank penetration in a 
host country might also force domestic banks to increase domestic credit in order to be com-
petitive against the foreign banks.
Figures 7–12. Response to generalised One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
(The models without the control variables) 
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positive at the 3rd quarter. The result is not consistent with the existing literature 
because Denizer (2000), Claessens et al. (2001), Zajc (2004) conclude that ris-
ing foreign assets in the banking sector tend to reduce host banking profitability. 
However, in Turkey, rising foreign bank assets are not mostly associated with 
higher numbers of banks in the banking sector, especially during the last two 
decades. 20 foreign banks were running business in Turkey at the end of 1992, 
and the total assets of these banks in the banking sector was US$ 2.37 billion. 
However, the total asset of these banks jumped to US$ 75.09 billion at the end of 
2009, even though the number of foreign banks in Turkey declined to 17. These 
numbers indicate that although there was a substantial jump in foreign bank as-
sets. The number of foreign banks also declined. Moreover, the total number 
of banks also declined from 69 in 1992 to 62 in 2009. Therefore, rising foreign 
assets in the banking sector was not associated with higher competition. There-
fore, it is clear that rising foreign assets are likely to increase profitability due to 
declining competition in the banking sector. The reverse effect is not statistically 
significant at the 1st quarter. 
The result of variance decomposition in the case of model 1 shows that shock 
to FBP is influenced by DB (14.475%) during the twelve-quarter period. On the 
other hand, DB appears as being more independent and the shock to DB thus 
Figure 13. The models with the control variables 
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Table 4. Variance decomposition
Models with the control variables
Model 1
Variance decomposition of DB Variance decomposition of FBP
Period DB FBP Period DB FBP
1 56.225 7.675 1 11.055 80.982
6 54.130 8.478 6 14.482 76.861
12 54.087 8.471 12 14.475 76.819
Model 2
Variance decomposition of CREDIT Variance decomposition of FBP
Period CREDIT FBP Period CREDIT FBP
1 69.668 17.698 1 11.538 81.033
6 44.083 18.104 6 16.553 65.257
12 42.944 17.669 12 16.484 64.734
Model 3
Variance decomposition of PRO Variance decomposition of FBP
Period PRO FBP Period PRO FBP
1 93.638 3.590 1 3.234 84.359
6 93.434 2.225 6 11.846 74.656
12 92.799 2.346 12 12.177 75.050
Models without the control variables
Model 1
Variance decomposition of DB Variance decomposition of FBP
Period DB FBP Period DB FBP
1 100.000 0.00 1 15.162 84.837
6 97.855 2.144 6 34.020 65.979
12 97.845 2.154 12 34.077 65.922
Model 2
Variance decomposition of CREDIT Variance decomposition of FBP
Period CREDIT FBP Period CREDIT FBP
1 100.000 0.000 1 19.582 80.417
6 93.691 6.308 6 33.366 66.633
12 93.690 6.309 12 33.432 66.567
Model 3
Variance decomposition of PRO Variance decomposition of FBP
Period PRO FBP Period PRO FBP
1 90.952 9.047 1 0.000 100.000
6 93.637 6.362 6 5.241 94.758
12 93.682 6.317 12 5.405 94.594
Note: Cholesky Ordering: FBP DB CREDIT PRO. Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship 
between FBP and banking variables (namely DB, CREDIT and PRO), the possible impacts of control variables 
on the banking variables and FBP and the reverse impacts are not presented in Table 4.
Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (1,000 repetitions).
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only accounts for 8.471% of variation in FBP after controlling for GDP and the 
2001 financial crisis. Regarding variance decomposition in the second model, 
where the shock to CREDIT accounted for 17.669% of variation in FBP, the 
shock to FBP is explained by CREDIT (16.484%) at the end of the twelve-quarter 
period after controlling for GDP and the 2001 financial crisis. For the banking 
profitability, the contribution of FBP to PRO variability ranges between 2.225% 
and 3.590% throughout the twelve-quarter period. With respect to PRO, FBP ac-
counts for 3.234% and 12.177% of its future variability.11 
11  As expected and seen in Table 4, the results without the control variables are partially differ-
ent than the ones with the control variables. However, the main explanations are based on the 
results from variance decomposition techniques (the models with the control variables).
Table 5. VAR residual autocorrelation LM tests
Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at lag order h
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lags LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob
1 2.964 0.563 2.157 0.706 7.212 0.125
2 0.789 0.939 0.846 0.932 2.056 0.725
3 1.563 0.815 2.113 0.714 4.104 0.392
4 2.053 0.725 1.328 0.856 8.032 0.090
5 0.198 0.995 3.790 0.435 6.240 0.181
6 2.576 0.631 3.526 0.473 4.223 0.376
7 4.268 0.370 4.683 0.321 1.157 0.885
8 7.866 0.096 4.446 0.348 6.272 0.179
9 4.066 0.397 2.902 0.574 2.232 0.693
10 1.195 0.878 0.330 0.987 5.503 0.239
11 0.051 0.999 3.980 0.408 0.466 0.976
12 0.645 0.957 0.401 0.982 1.298 0.861
Note: Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
Table 6. VAR residual heteroskedasticity tests
No cross terms (only levels and squares)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Chi-sq Prob Chi-sq Prob Chi-sq Prob
35.218 0.505 30.358 0.173 7.572 0.817
Includes cross terms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Chi-sq Prob Chi-sq Prob Chi-sq Prob
74.584 0.679 56.644 0.065 9.551 0.847
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As a part of the diagnostic tests, I applied the diagnostic tests for the models 
with the control variables such as autocorrelation LM and VAR residual hetero-
skedasticity to test the stability of the VAR models. My evidence, presented in 
Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix, show that there is no heteroskedasticity, no auto-
correlation, and no serial correlation in my models. In addition, the inverse roots 
of AR characteristic polynomial were performed to detect the stability of the VAR 
models; the results of this test are presented in Figure 13. The findings in Fig-
ure 13 are found to be satisfactory for all models. As a part of diagnostic test, 
I also performed the out-of-sample test to see the stable of the models. I performed 
the same models using first 60 and 56 observations. The results of the models in 
first 60 and 56 observation models are similar with the models that I performed 
with 64 observations. There is no change in the significance of causalities and no 
change in the signs of relationship in impulse response functions.12  
6. CONCLUSION
Until the beginning of the 2000s, FBP did not really take place as expected be-
cause of political and macroeconomic instability and bureaucratic barriers for 
foreign projects. Therefore, the share of foreign bank assets in the Turkish bank-
ing sector still remains below 5%. However, positive macroeconomic indicators, 
the attainment of political stability, the acceleration of reforms, especially in the 
finance sector (such as a switch to a floating exchange rate, greater central bank 
independence, and pursuit of a more credible monetary policy), the foundation 
of the Coordination Council and Investment Advisory Council, the new FDI law 
(No.4785), and the reduction in corporate tax led to a high growth rate in the 
banking sector in Turkey. Apart from these factors, the ongoing negotiation be-
tween the EU and Turkey on integration and the gradual rise of the share of bank-
ing assets to GNP have made Turkey a more interesting country to investigate and 
opened new debate on the Turkish banking sector. 
Using VAR techniques, this study examines the short-run relations between 
FBP and the determinants of bank performance, namely domestic bank assets, 
profitability and total domestic credit, while controlling for GDP and the 2001 
financial crisis. In the first model, I find that there is unilateral causality which 
runs from DB to FBP at the 10% level. Moreover, response to initial shock to 
12  The findings with 60 and 56 observations models are not presented. The models are performed 
with the control variables. The diagnostic tests implemented for the models with the control 
variables are also implemented for the models without the control variables. However, the re-
sults from the diagnostic tests are not presented for the models without the control variables.   
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FBP by DB is significantly positive. Therefore, rising domestic bank assets in 
Turkey tend to contribute positively to FBP. The reverse line is initially positive 
and significant as well. Such results in the reverse line are in line with the find-
ing of Engwall et al. (2001). However, they investigated only a one-way impact 
– from foreign bank assets to domestic bank assets in the Nordic countries. In ad-
dition, my finding also reveals that domestic bank assets in model 1 appear more 
exogenous than foreign bank assets. As a result of the first model, the current 
government in Turkey should continue to encourage foreign bank entries to force 
domestic banks to be innovative and to increase their assets.     
The result regarding the block exogeneity Wald test also indicates for the sec-
ond model that there is bilateral causality between FBP and CREDIT. By ana-
lysing the impulse response function, FBP is important for credit availability in 
Turkey in the short run. This is consistent with the finding of Clarke (2006). The 
reverse line is positive and significant at the 1st and 3rd quarter periods, suggesting 
that available domestic credit in the market has a positive impact on FBP. This 
direction of a positive impact is also consistent with the existing literature and ra-
tional because it is well known that financial development is an important factor 
for attracting foreign banks to host markets. As a result of this finding, the current 
government in Turkey should continue to encourage foreign bank entries in order 
to increase the availability of credits to the domestic market.     
Regarding the relationship between profitability in the banking sector and 
FBP, my findings are quite interesting. The Granger causality test showed that no 
causal relationship between FBP and PRO was detected at the 5% and 10% lev-
els. More interestingly, the response of PRO to one standard deviation shock in 
FBP is statistically significant and positive at the 3rd quarter. This implies that ris-
ing FBP is associated with rising profitability in the Turkish banking sector. This 
is because the entry mode of the foreign banks has shifted from greenfield invest-
ment to mergers and acquisitions, especially during and after the 2001 financial 
crisis.13 Therefore, substantially rising foreign bank assets have not been associ-
ated with an increasing number of foreign banks. This is not in line with previous 
findings such as Denizer (2000); Claessens et al. (2001) and Zajc (2004). Our 
finding is likely to open new debates regarding the relationship between foreign 
bank entries and profitability in developing countries such as Turkey and further 
research should therefore be made. The reverse effect is initially positive, but not 
significant, although earlier findings reveal that profitability in a host market is a 
main driving factor behind the foreign bank entries.
13  The changing perspective of multinational banks over time and the acceleration of privatisa-
tion implementations (especially for unhealthy banks and public banks) in the Turkish bank-
ing sector have led to changes in the entry mode of foreign banks since the beginning of the 
2001 financial crisis. 
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